

Agro-Terrorism Push Factors in Ebonyi State

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ABSTRACT

This research aimed to identify the potential drivers of agro-terrorism in Ebonyi State. Employing a multi-stage random sampling approach, this study selected respondents from six local government areas, representing two from each of the three agricultural zones in Ebonyi State. Subsequently, twelve communities were chosen at random from the selected local government areas. Within these communities, a total of 240 farmers, with 20 farmers selected randomly from each of the 12 communities, constituted the study's sample size. The study primarily utilized structured questionnaires and interview schedules to gather data and descriptive statistics were employed for data analysis. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was employed to identify the socio-economic characteristics of farmers in Ebonyi State. The study's findings revealed that agro-terrorism, particularly herdsmen attacks, and crop infestation, held prominent positions among the reported agro-terrorism acts. Farmers in the study area affirmed these threats at rates of 91.7% and 69.2%, respectively. In contrast, awareness levels were lower for other forms of agro-terrorism, such as livestock poisoning (56.7%), water poisoning (44.6%), and the coercion of farmers to purchase genetically modified seeds (GMO) (14.6%). This research contributes valuable insights to the government's efforts to address agro-terrorism. It underscores the need for farmer training programs and serves as a foundational tool for policy formulation and program development aimed at enhancing farmers' awareness and preparedness regarding agro-terrorism.

Keywords: Agro-terrorism, Push factor, Awareness, Farmers

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Agro-terrorism, a variant of bioterrorism, is characterized by the intentional introduction of diseases or pests affecting animals and plants into a nation's agricultural and food production systems, aiming to induce fear, incur economic damages, and disrupt social harmony (Abhimanyu, 2016). According to Pimentel, Lach, Zuniga, and Morrison (2000), agro-terrorism manifests in various ways, which may involve actions such as contaminating livestock, or deliberately introducing and disseminating pathogens that affect both plants and animals. Monke (2007) posited that agro-terrorism has the potential to damage an adversary's economy and undermine its resolve. That is, agro-terrorism can cause economic damage to a country or entity that is seen as an adversary. This harm could result from the destruction of crops, loss of livestock, or disruptions in the food supply chain, all of which can have significant economic consequences. An organization employing agro-terrorism can attain its goals and harm its adversary by creating fear and economic distress without resorting to fatal violence against individuals. According to Kennedy (2011), agro-terrorism is a plausible threat if a terrorist group's goal is to cause severe economic damage to a country. Ogundipe, as cited in Chukwuma (2016), emphasized that Nigeria, being the most

populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa with over 150 million people, faces heightened susceptibility to epidemics stemming from global food supply chain disruptions, international food crises, and insecurity, whether stemming from natural or human-induced factors. Ebonyi State's economy relies heavily on agriculture and the food industry, with a significant dependence on international trade for crop exports such as rice and yam, making it vulnerable to disruption in the event of an agro-terrorism attack.

While there have been isolated incidents of agro-terrorism reported in Ebonyi State, as documented by Ikechukwu and Agunannah (2023) study, it is imperative to delve into the underlying factors contributing to these occurrences in light of the escalating terrorism threat. This research aims to shed light on the tactics and motivations employed by various terrorist entities targeting the agricultural sector. Additionally, it seeks to devise effective countermeasures and strategies, with a primary focus on raising awareness among farmers. The insights derived from this investigation hold the potential to guide government efforts in delivering training to farmers and serving as a foundation for the development of policies and programs aimed at enhancing farmers' knowledge of agro-terrorism at the grassroots level.

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

Agriculture exhibits distinct vulnerabilities stemming from a variety of inherent attributes. The attractiveness of agricultural terrorism stems from its cost-effectiveness and technical viability, along with the vulnerability and transparency of farming activities. Additionally, the potential for agricultural attacks to inflict substantial disruptions and economic damage makes them an appealing option for terrorists. As highlighted by Monke in his 2007 study, these traits encompass:

i. In rural agricultural settings, farms often find themselves situated in vulnerable locations, such as expansive open fields and

pastures scattered across the countryside. This spatial arrangement sometimes necessitates the concentration of livestock within confined spaces, such as vast feedlots teeming with thousands of cattle in outdoor enclosures, farms accommodating tens of thousands of pigs, or barns housing hundreds of thousands of poultry. Unfortunately, this proximity of animals in confined settings can facilitate the rapid spread of diseases among the livestock population. Furthermore, the nature of agricultural practices often demands extensive land resources, which pose challenges in terms of ensuring security. Additionally, the consolidation of slaughterhouses and processing facilities on a large scale can potentially expose the agricultural sector to heightened risks of widespread contamination.

ii. Plants and animals have a larger number of harmful and contagious biological agents than humans. The infections are easier for terrorists to acquire, manage, and deploy since they are environmentally hardy, endemic in other nations, and non-hazardous to humans.

iii. In the realm of production and processing systems, a continuous flow of live animals, grains, and processed food products is in constant motion, intermingling without restraint. These dynamic factors transcend any inherent limitations that might otherwise serve as barriers to prevent the spread of pathogens.

iv. Maintaining a pest and disease-free status is crucial for global trade in animals, cereals, and food products. The mere presence of such threats in a country can halt exports, causing economic losses and potential conflicts with rival nations.

v. In the realm of veterinary medicine and scientific research, there exists a notable dearth of knowledge concerning infectious diseases originating from foreign nations. This knowledge gap has the potential to impede the prompt identification of symptoms and hinder the capacity to effectively address an outbreak in the event of its occurrence.

As stated by Peter (2003), additional significant factors contributing to the susceptibility of agriculture to intentional disruption encompass.

i. The prevailing agricultural practices in Nigeria are marked by a notable degree of concentration and intensity, particularly in livestock farming. In this context, animals are raised in densely populated environments, often in close proximity to each other. The potential outbreak of a highly contagious disease within such facilities, particularly one that can spread through the air, would present an exceptionally challenging containment scenario. Such an outbreak would likely necessitate the costly and formidable task of culling all affected livestock, reminiscent of the formidable challenges encountered during the 2006 avian flu outbreak in Nigeria, which lacked scientifically validated vaccines for effective control.

ii. In recent years, there has been a notable surge in the susceptibility of both plants and livestock to diseases. This heightened vulnerability can be attributed to significant shifts in agricultural management techniques and the introduction of biotechnological innovations aimed at enhancing the overall quality and quantity of agricultural yields. These transformative changes have not only impacted the productivity of the agricultural sector but have also led to an increase in stress levels among exposed animals. The evolving landscape of husbandry practices has witnessed the implementation of various measures such as sterilization programs, dehorning, branding, crowding, and hormone injections. While these interventions have been employed with the intention of optimizing livestock production, they have inadvertently compromised the innate resistance of animals to infectious pathogens. Concurrently, in cases of infection, there has been a notable upsurge in the quantity of bacteria excreted, further exacerbating the disease risk

iii. Insufficient Agricultural Security Measures and Surveillance: Agroterrorism has been a largely overlooked concern within

the farming sector, with a notable absence of the necessary physical infrastructure and preparedness to counteract it.

The study of Abhimanyu (2016) highlighted the attractiveness of agro-terrorism to terrorists due to its distinctive characteristics. The ease of obtaining infectious agents, coupled with the minimal expertise required to infect plants and animals, renders it an appealing option for those with malicious intent. Furthermore, agro-terrorism offers a cost-effective means of generating widespread disruption through low-tech methods. The prevalence of intensive and concentrated farming practices may accelerate the spread of infectious agents, potentially leading to delays in detecting symptoms of illness.

The most effective approach to mitigating the risk of agro-terrorism is proactive prevention, with biosecurity playing a pivotal role in this overarching strategy. Coined in 1993 by agricultural and environmental biology groups in response to growing concerns about biological terrorism (Koblentz, 2012), the term "biosecurity" encompasses a multifaceted concept. It not only addresses the protection against the theft of international biological materials from laboratories but also encompasses a comprehensive set of policies and strategies aimed at safeguarding human populations, natural resources, plants, and animals from potentially perilous foreign species and diseases.

While the expanding biotechnology and bioengineering sectors have undoubtedly contributed to economic growth, they have also heightened the potential risks associated with agro-terrorism (Jefferson, Lentzos & Marris, 2014). The crux of the issue lies in the increasing accessibility and openness of potentially hazardous technologies. As noted by Lakoff and Collier (2008), the essence of biosecurity involves the establishment of isolation stations and stringent border controls for scrutinizing imported agricultural products. These measures are designed to secure the agricultural,

horticultural, and forestry sectors against the incursion of foreign pests and diseases. To further mitigate the threat to agriculture, it is imperative that rigorous biosecurity standards be implemented and adhered to consistently. These standards are integral to safeguarding our agricultural sector and ensuring its resilience against potential threats.

Okonkwo and Udeze (2017) in their study argued that while biomedical developments and the internationalization of scientific and technical expertise have significantly enhanced human safety, there is a possibility that these advancements could make it easier for terrorists to manufacture biological weapons for agro-terrorism. Specifically, they suggested that these developments might inadvertently facilitate the production of biological weapons by terrorists for the purpose of agro-terrorism. Furthermore, they proposed that the basic concept of biosecurity, which entails quarantine stations and border inspections, was initially designed with commercial interests in mind to secure agricultural products, horticultural practices, and forestry industries from exotic pests and diseases.

Biosecurity is described as protecting the safety of biological materials to avoid theft, unauthorized use, and/or discharge (Njiruh & Wakhungu, 2017). Awareness training is also important for promoting readiness and security in the state. Biosecurity is an element of the preparedness strategy, and it is critical for a healthy system. The inclusion of biosecurity within the larger framework of agro-security is a simple way to bring issues to the attention of a larger audience. In a rural community, biosecurity and general security are everyone's concerns, and good communication is essential for raising awareness (Richard, 2007).

Terrorist motivations are diverse in nature. Agro-terrorism attacks may stem from motives such as seeking revenge against a farmer or government, attempting to incite fear through a food scare, or aligning with an ideology that calls for the elimination of agricultural products. These represent just a

subset of potential motivations, with profit-driven and anti-GMO motives standing out as the primary drivers.

1. Profit Motive: The fluctuations in agribusiness can have a significant impact on various individuals and organizations. The pursuit of financial gain may incentivize these entities to engage in activities that can adversely affect the agriculture sector. For instance, if Ebonyi state were to impose export restrictions due to disease outbreaks, foreign agricultural producers could benefit by gaining a larger market share. Additionally, a localized disease epidemic, particularly one that is not communicable, on a competitor's farm could prove advantageous to a local grower. In some cases, diseases that do not lead to nationwide trade prohibitions may even be deliberately introduced to give a domestic producer a competitive edge over their peers.
2. Anti-GMO (genetically modified organism) motive: According to James (2000), there is a growing concern regarding a faction of individuals intent on causing harm to agricultural products – the anti-GMO groups. In the United States, spanning seven states and involving at least eighteen separate incidents, anti-GMO activists have taken aggressive actions against both university and corporate research facilities. James argues that these groups have showcased their dedication to the elimination of specific crops. Considering the potential for greater impact with less effort, the use of biological weapons might become an enticing option for these groups if they believe it aligns with their cause, even if it means resorting to extreme means.
3. Herdsmen attack on Agriculture and Farmers: The menace of the Fulani-Herdsmen attacks has grave implications for Nigeria's political and socio-economic development. Fulani-Herdsmen, nomadic herders with historical roots in West Africa's Futa

Jalon Mountains, primarily engage in livestock husbandry. They predominantly inhabit the Sahel and semi-arid regions of West Africa, but due to shifting climate patterns, many have relocated to the savannah and tropical forest belts (Iro, 1994). The presence of Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria dates to the 13th and 14th centuries when they migrated from the Senegambia region to northern Nigeria. During the dry season, they herd their cattle to the middle belt zone, which is inhabited by non-Hausa communities, before returning northward at the onset of the rainy season. However, this practice of cattle herding encroaches on farmland, resulting in crop destruction and tensions between herdsmen and farmers (Crisis, 2015).

3.0 METHODOLOGY

A multi-stage random sampling technique was employed in the selection of the respondents for the study. It is used for easy enumeration of large clusters and will ensure that the data is spread across the population.

Stage one: Random selection of two Local Government Areas (LGAs) from the three agricultural zones in Ebonyi State. This will make a total of six (6) local Government areas for the State.

Stage two: From the six Local Government Areas that were randomly selected, two communities were randomly selected. This gave a total of twelve (12) communities in the state.

Stage three: For the purpose of this study, we randomly selected 20 farmers from each of the 12 communities in the State, resulting in a total sample size of 240 farmers.

The study primarily gathered data through structured questionnaires and interview schedules. Questionnaires were distributed to literate respondents while interview schedules were conducted with illiterate participants and their responses were duly recorded. The data collection instrument was organized into sections to reflect the specific objectives of the study.

Data on agro-terrorism push factors included variable factors like unfavorable political climate, inadequate security, unorganized animal routes, unfavorable agricultural policies, herdsmen-farmers conflict, communal conflict, profit-making, etc.

Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was employed to identify the socio-economic characteristics of farmers in Ebonyi State. Principal component analysis or factor loading is the most common form of factor analysis. It seeks a linear combination of variables such that the maximum variable is extracted from the variables. It then removes this variance and seeks a second linear combination which explains the maximum proportion of the remaining variance and so on. Canonical factor analysis, common factor analysis, picture factoring, and alpha factoring are some of the other types of factor analysis.

This study used principal component analysis (PCA) or factor loading, depending on the factors to be addressed. Meanwhile, the basic assumptions of factor analysis are as follows:

- i. The error term (e_i) are independent of one another such that $E(e_i) = 0$, $\text{var}(e_i) = b_1$. Hence, each e_i is an outcome of a random variable drawn with replacement from a population of e_i value having a mean of 0 and certain variance, b_1^2 .
- ii. The observable factors, F_j are independent of one another and the error terms, such that $E(F_j) = 0$, and $\text{var}(F_j) = 1$. Therefore, each observable variable or factor Y_i is a linear function of independent factors, F_i and error terms, e_i .

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 F_1 + \beta_2 F_2 + \beta_3 F_3 + \dots + \beta_n F_n + e_i$$

Where;

β_0 = parameters or loading

$\beta_1 - \beta_n$ = the loading of variable Y_i on factors, F_n . The factors that tend to load higher than the others will be isolated as being a positive factor.

Hence, the variables of objective (agro-terrorism push factors in Ebonyi State) which

are to be subjected to factor analysis include unfavorable political climate, inadequate security, unorganized animal routes, unfavorable agricultural policies, herdsman-farmers conflict, communal conflict, profit-making, enforcing farmers to adopt GMO, competing countries on export product, revenge against a farmer or a farming community.

4.0 RESULTS

Principal factor analysis was used to analyze agro-terrorism push factors in the study area.

The interpretation boils down to identifying variables that load high in each component matrix which were used in naming the factors. According to Kaiser’s (1958) rule of thumb, variables with a coefficient of 0.40 or more have high loading and may be used in naming a factor. This rule has been generally applied (Nwibo & Okorie 2013; Ezeh & Eze, 2016). Hence, only variables with factor loading of 0.40 and at 10% overlapping variance were used in naming the constraints in this analysis. The summary of the result is presented in Table 1a and 1b.

Table 1a: Distribution of Respondents According to Factors Influencing Agro-terrorism in the Study Area.

Factors	Frequency (n=240)*	Percentage
Unfavorable political climate	116	48.3
Inadequate security	206	85.6
Unorganized animal routes	134	55.8
Unfavorable agricultural policies	142	59.2
Herdsman-farmers conflict	192	80.0
Communal conflict	80	33.3
Profit-making	50	20.8
Enforcing farmers to adopt GMO	26	10.8
Competing countries on export product	43	17.9
Revenge against a farmer or a farming community	64	26.7

Source: Field Survey Data (2019)

Table 1a presents data from a 2019 field survey on factors influencing agro-terrorism in Ebonyi State, Nigeria. It includes the frequency and percentage of respondents' views on various factors. The most prominent factors perceived as influencing agro-terrorism are inadequate security (85.6%), followed by herdsman-farmers conflict (80.0%), and unfavorable agricultural policies (59.2%). Other factors mentioned include unfavorable political

climate (48.3%), unorganized animal routes (55.8%), and communal conflict (33.3%). Less common factors include profit-making (20.8%), enforcing GMO adoption (10.8%), competing countries on export products (17.9%), and revenge against farmers or farming communities (26.7%). These findings highlight the multifaceted nature of agro-terrorism concerns in the study area, with security and conflicts being primary concerns.

Table 1b: Varimax Rotation Matrix of Agro-Terrorism Push-Factors

Push-Factors	Component 1	Component 2	Component 3
	Social Conflict	Institutional Factor	Economic Motive
Unfavorable political climate	0.210	-0.058	-0.513
Inadequate security	-0.355	0.684	-0.102
Unorganized animal routes	0.170	0.481	0.172
Unfavorable agricultural policies	0.044	0.702	0.320
Herdsman-farmers conflict	0.825	0.096	0.184
Communal conflict	0.747	0.150	0.344
Profit-making	-0.092	-0.004	0.691
Enforcing farmer to adopt GMO	0.361	0.604	-0.199
Competing countries on export product	-0.351	0.345	0.576
Revenge against a farmer or a farming community	0.739	0.010	-0.044

Source: Field Survey Data (2019)

Table 1b represents a Varimax Rotation Matrix of Agro-Terrorism push factors, which analyze factors that could motivate agro-terrorism activities. Varimax rotation is a statistical technique used in factor analysis

to simplify and interpret complex relationships among variables. There are three components in the table, (Component 1 - Social Conflict factor, Component 2 - Institutional Factor, and Component 3 -

Economic Motive). These three components, therefore, represent the principal push factors of agro-terrorism in Ebonyi State, Nigeria.

Component 1 is associated with factors related to social conflicts, such as herdsman-farmers conflict (0.825), communal conflict, (0.747), and revenge against a farmer or a farming community (0.739). These factors have strong positive loadings on Component 1, indicating that they are closely related.

Component 2 represents institutional factors, which arose out of poor government policy framework for addressing agro-terrorism. Factors like inadequate security, inadequate security (0.684), unorganized animal routes (0.481), unfavorable agricultural policies (0.702), and enforcing farmers to adopt GMOs (0.604), have strong positive loadings on this component. It suggests that these institutional shortcomings could motivate agro-terrorism.

Component 3 represents economic motives, as factors like profit-making (0.691), and competing countries on export product (0.576) have higher loadings on this component. This suggests that economic incentives or interests may play a role in agro-terrorism activities.

Overall, this table provides insights into the different dimensions of push factors for agro-terrorism, highlighting the importance of social conflicts, institutional factors, and economic motives in understanding the motivations behind such activities.

5.0 DISCUSSION

The findings presented in Table 1a from a 2019 field survey in Ebonyi State, Nigeria, shed light on the factors influencing agro-terrorism in the region. These findings are essential for policymakers and security agencies to develop effective strategies for preventing and mitigating agro-terrorism threats. From the data, the most prominent factor perceived as influencing agro-terrorism is inadequate security, with a staggering 85.6% of respondents highlighting this concern. This high percentage underscores the critical role that security plays in agro-terrorism prevention.

It implies that improving security measures in agricultural areas should be a top priority for the authorities. The second most significant factor is the herdsman-farmers conflict, with 80.0% of respondents identifying it as an influential factor. This finding reflects the ongoing tension between herders and farmers in many parts of Nigeria, often leading to violent conflicts. Addressing this issue is crucial not only for preventing agro-terrorism but also for promoting peace and stability in rural areas. Unfavorable agricultural policies were mentioned by 59.2% of respondents as a factor influencing agro-terrorism. This suggests that government policies related to agriculture play a significant role in the security landscape of Ebonyi State. Policymakers need to review and reform these policies to address the concerns raised by the respondents. Other factors mentioned, such as an unfavorable political climate (48.3%), unorganized animal routes (55.8%), and communal conflicts (33.3%), further emphasize the complexity of the agro-terrorism issue. These factors are interconnected and can exacerbate the security challenges faced by the agricultural community. Less common factors include profit-making (20.8%), enforcing GMO adoption (10.8%), competing countries on export products (17.9%), and revenge against farmers or farming communities (26.7%). While these factors may not be as prevalent, they still deserve attention. Economic incentives, international competition, and personal vendettas can motivate individuals or groups to engage in agro-terrorism.

Table 1b provides additional insights into the motivations behind agro-terrorism by presenting a Varimax Rotation Matrix of Agro-Terrorism push factors. This statistical technique simplifies and interprets complex relationships among variables, revealing three principal push factors:

1. Social Conflict Factor (Component 1):

This component is associated with factors related to social conflicts, such as herdsman-farmers conflict, communal conflict, and revenge against farmers or

farming communities. These factors have strong positive loadings on Component 1, indicating their close relationship. This highlights the role of social tensions in motivating agro-terrorism activities.

- 2. Institutional Factor (Component 2):** This component represents institutional factors stemming from poor government policy frameworks. Factors like inadequate security, unorganized animal routes, unfavorable agricultural policies, and enforcing GMO adoption have strong positive loadings on Component 2. This suggests that institutional shortcomings can be significant motivators for agro-terrorism.

Economic Motive (Component 3): The third component represents economic motives, with factors like profit-making and competing countries on export products having higher loadings. This implies that economic incentives or interests may also drive individuals or groups to engage in agro-terrorism activities.

In summary, the data in Table 1a highlights the multifaceted nature of agro-terrorism concerns in Ebonyi State, Nigeria. Security, conflicts, and institutional shortcomings emerge as primary concerns, but economic motives and other factors also play a role. To effectively address agro-terrorism, a comprehensive approach is needed, encompassing improved security measures, conflict resolution mechanisms, policy reforms, and economic development initiatives. The Varimax Rotation Matrix in Table 1b further underscores the importance of understanding the different dimensions of push factors for agro-terrorism. Social conflicts, institutional deficiencies, and economic motivations all contribute to the complex landscape of agro-terrorism in Ebonyi State. Policymakers and security agencies should consider these factors when designing strategies to combat agro-terrorism effectively.

6.0 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the findings from the 2019 field survey conducted in Ebonyi State, Nigeria, shed light on the complex factors influencing agro-terrorism in the region. This study employed rigorous research methods, including a well-structured questionnaire and statistical analysis, to identify and categorize the principal push factors of agro-terrorism. The results highlight the multifaceted nature of agro-terrorism concerns, with social conflicts, institutional shortcomings, and economic motives emerging as the key drivers behind these activities.

First and foremost, the survey identified social conflict as a significant push factor for agro-terrorism in Ebonyi State. This is particularly evident in the strong positive loadings of factors such as herdsman-farmers conflict (0.825), communal conflict (0.747), and revenge against farmers or farming communities (0.739) on Component 1. These findings emphasize the importance of addressing social tensions and conflicts in the region as a means of reducing agro-terrorism risk. Strategies aimed at conflict resolution and community reconciliation may prove crucial in mitigating this aspect of the problem.

Secondly, institutional factors were identified as another critical motivator for agro-terrorism activities. The poor government policy framework for addressing agro-terrorism was reflected in the strong positive loadings of factors like inadequate security (0.684), unorganized animal routes (0.481), unfavorable agricultural policies (0.702), and the enforcement of GMO adoption (0.604) on Component 2. These institutional shortcomings not only create vulnerabilities but also provide incentives for individuals or groups to engage in agro-terrorism. It is imperative for policymakers and authorities to address these institutional weaknesses, strengthen security measures, and improve agricultural policies to discourage potential agro-terrorism actors.

Lastly, economic motives were found to play a role in agro-terrorism activities in Ebonyi State. The positive loadings of profit-making

(0.691) and competition with other countries on export products (0.576) in Component 3 highlight the economic incentives or interests that may drive individuals or groups to engage in agro-terrorism. Addressing economic factors contributing to agro-terrorism involves promoting economic opportunities and livelihoods in the agricultural sector while ensuring fair trade practices and competition. Creating economic alternatives that are more attractive than engaging in agro-terrorism is essential to addressing this aspect of the problem.

This study's comprehensive analysis of agro-terrorism push factors in Ebonyi State, Nigeria, provides valuable insights for policymakers, security agencies, and stakeholders. It underscores the need for a multifaceted approach to address the root causes of agro-terrorism, including resolving social conflicts, strengthening institutional frameworks, and addressing economic disparities. Efforts to mitigate agro-terrorism in the region should be informed by a nuanced understanding of these push factors and should aim to create an environment where individuals and communities are less inclined to resort to acts of agro-terrorism.

Finally, the findings emphasize the importance of ongoing research and data collection to monitor and adapt strategies aimed at countering agro-terrorism. As the socio-political and economic landscape evolves, so too may the factors driving agro-terrorism. Therefore, a proactive and dynamic approach is essential to effectively address this complex security challenge in Ebonyi State and beyond.

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